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DISQUALIFICATION OF THE TESTIFYING
ADVOCATE-A FIRM RULE?
HAROLD A. BROWNI AND Louis M. BROWNt
In 1978, the California Supreme Court in Comden v. Superior
Court' disqualified Loeb & Loeb, a seventy-five member Los Angeles
law firm, from representing plaintiff in a litigation matter because the
trial court concluded it could not say with any security that Marvin
Greene, a member of Loeb & Loeb, would not be called as a witness in
the trial.2 The supreme court decision was the high point of a legal
battle that continued even after the disqualification of Loeb & Loeb.
When the skirmish on legal ethics finally ended (if it has ended),3 the
attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants were disqualified on the
same ground: that a member of their firm ought to be a witness in the
trial of the matter.
The disqualification of counsel for both sides in Comden naturally
raises, if not forces, the question of the utility and practicality of the
rule of ethics that resulted in the disqualifications. Even without the
disqualifications of counsel for both sides, the necessity of disqualifying
an entire firm because one member of the firm, who will not be trial
counsel, may be a witness is questionable. Indeed, it is instructive that
t Member, California Bar, attorney with Gang, Tyre & Brown, Hollywood, Cal.; B.A.
1973, Occidental College- J.D. 1976, University of California.
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California; B.A. 1930, University of Southern
California; J.D. 1933, Harvard University; LL.D. 1977, Manhattan College.
We would like to thank the following lawyers involved in the Comden case: Mr. Harold
Friedman and Mr. Peter Niemiec of Loeb & Loeb; Mr. Richard Agay of Cooper, Epstein &
Hurewitz; and Mr. David Stuber of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, who gave us the benefit of
his observations shortly after that firm was substituted in place of Loeb & Loeb.
We would also like to thank Mr. Ron Stovitz, one of the attorneys for the State Bar of Cali-
fornia, who supplied us with the amicus curiae brief of the State Bar and advised us of the action
taken by the State Bar Board of Governors to amend the California rule; and Mr. Paul Devin of
Peabody & Arnold (Boston, Mass.), who compiled a list of advisory opinions of bar association
committees on this subject.
1. 20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 568 (1978).
2. Other members of Loeb '& Loeb were also potential witnesses, but the supreme court
attached less significance to their roles as witnesses. Id at 912, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at
11.
3. Loeb & Loeb's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court has been de-
nied. 99 S. Ct. 568 (1978).
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State Bar Associations of California,4 New York and Connecticut'
have submitted briefs against such disqualifications.
This article will examine the rule that underlies such disqualifica-
tions, as it is presently written and enforced, and will examine ,the po-
tential impact of the rule within and without the litigation context.
We are, at the least, skeptical whether the rule serves any legitimate
purpose. More important, we are convinced that the rule purpose-
lessly interferes with the lawyer-client relationship and inhibits legiti-
mate action by counsel both in the planning and preventive stages
when the transaction is taking place, and throughout the litigation
process. The rule unnecessarily complicates counsel's decision in rep-
resenting a client, since a thoughtful attorney now has to keep in mind
that as a result of any action he7 might take he could become a
percipient witness and thus disqualify his firm from further represent-
ing his client in litigation. In response, the lawyer may refrain from
taking otherwise appropriate action in order to protect the lawyer-cli-
ent relationship, or may jeopardize the relationship that both lawyer
and client have nurtured, or both.
I. THE LAW
Although the court in Comden applied a statute unique to Califor-
nia,8 that statute is derived from and is almost identical to two discipli-
nary rules contained in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
which was promulgated in 19699 and became effective in 1970. Since
1970, the ABA Code has been adopted in all states and has also been
adopted as the local rules of court in several federal districts. Even
where not adopted, the Code may serve as a guide to trial judges in
controlling the conduct of attorneys in their courtrooms.' 0
4. State Bar of California Brief as Amicus Curiae, Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d
906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 568 (1978).
5. New York State Bar Association Brief as Amicus Curiae, International Elecs. Corp. v.
Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975); Connecticut Bar Association Brief as Amicus Curiae, id
6. We will not, however, examine the rule as it applied to the trial counsel-witness, ie., the
lawyer who will appear in one matter before judge or jury both as lawyer and witness.
7. For simplicity, we have chosen the masculine gender when referring to counsel and
clients.
8. Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, rule 2-1 I (A)(4), CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE foll. § 6076 (,Vest Cum. Supp. 1979).
9. DR 5-101(B), -102; see International Elecs.Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975).
10. Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348,
1351 (D. Colo. 1976); Stanwick Corp. v. United States, No. 77-115 (U.S. Ct. Cl., filed July 14,
1978).
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The disciplinary rules of the ABA Code define those circum-
stances in which a lawyer may accept employment or may continue
employment when he learns that he or a member of his firm ought to
be called as a witness on behalf of his client or other than on behalf of
his client.
DR 5-101 ....
(B) A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or
pending litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a law-
yer in his firm ought to be called as a witness, except that he
may undertake the employment and he or a lawyer in his firm
may testify:
(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested
matter.
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of for-
mality and there is no reason to believe that substan-
tial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony.
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and
value of legal services rendered in the case by the law-
yer or his firm to the client.
(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial
hardship on the client because of the distinctive value
of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular
case."
DR 5-102 ....
(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in
his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client,
he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his firm, if
any, shall not continue representation in the trial, except that
he may continue the representation and he or a lawyer in his
firm may testify in the circumstances enumerated in DR 5-
101(B)(1) through (4).
(B) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in
his firm may be called as a witness other than on behalf of his
client, he may continue the representation until it is apparent
that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client. "
11. DR 5-101(B).
12. DR 5-102.
1979]
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The disciplinary rules are not the only section of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, but they are the most influential because they
"state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall
without being subject to disciplinary action."' 3 They have been drafted
to be enacted as law in various states and to be enforced by enforcing
agencies, although the Code gives no indication of the role such agen-
cies should play. t4
The Code also contains ethical considerations that are "aspira-
tional in character and represent the objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive."' 5 The ethical considerations
"constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyers [and courts]
can rely for guidance in many specific situations."' 6 The ethical con-
sideration concerning an attorney's accepting or continuing employ-
ment when a member of the attorney's firm is a potential witness
provides, in part:
Problems incident to the lawyer-witness relationship arise at different
stages; they relate either to whether a lawyer should accept employ-
ment or should withdraw from employment. Regardless of when the
problem arises, his decision is to be governed by the same basic con-
siderations. It is not objectionable for a lawyer who is a potential
witness to be an advocate if it is unlikely that he will be called as a
witness because his testimony would be merely cumulative or if his
testimony will relate only to an uncontested issue. In the exceptional
situation where it will be manifestly unfair to the client for the law-
yer to refuse employment or to withdraw when he will likely be a
witness on a contested issue, he may serve as advocate even though
he may be a witness. In making such decision, he should determine
the personal or financial sacrifice of the client that may result from
his refusal of employment or withdrawal therefrom, the materiality
of his testimony, and the effectiveness of his representation in view of
his personal involvement. In weighing thesefactors, it should be clear
that refusal or withdrawal will impose an unreasonable hardshp upon
the client before the lawyer accepts or continues the employment.
Where the question arises, doubts should be resolved in favor of the
lawyer testfying and against his becoming or continuing as an
advocate. 17
Thus the ethical considerations, like the disciplinary rules, take a
13. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble.
14. Id
15. Id
16. Id; see Connell v. Clairol, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Miller Elec. Constr.,
Inc. v. Devine Lighting Co., 421 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Comden v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 568 (1978).
17. EC 5-10 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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hard line by favoring withdrawal unless the client suffers an
unreasonable hardship thereby. At the same time, however, the ethical
considerations speak of an attorney's weighing factors, including the
materiality of testimony and the effectiveness of his representation,
before making the determination to resign. The disciplinary rules do
not afford the lawyer even the luxury of subjective considerations to
cushion later arguments.' 8 Rather, the disciplinary rules appear to ob-
jectify the lawyer's dilemma, which makes it even easier for a court to
order disqualification.
Although enforcement of disciplinary rules 5-101(B) and 5-102 has
not been uniform from one jurisdiction to the next, the courts have
predominantly taken a strict approach.19 No court has adopted the ap-
proach suggested by the dissent in Comden that the withdrawal rule
should be enforced only in bar disciplinary hearings rather than in the
context of ongoing litigation.2 0 Nor has any court held that a client has
18. This is the reverse of what it should be. The disciplinary rules, since they state a mini-
mum level of conduct, are intended to be easier to comply with than the ethical considerations,
which are aspirational; but in this instance, a lawyer might meet the standards in the ethical con-
siderations while failing to comply with the disciplinary rules.
19. See, e.g., Connell v. Clairol, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Ga. 1977). The courts are no-
ticeably more lenient in applying DR 5-102(B) than DR 5-101(B) or DR 5-102(A). Disciplinary
rule 5-102(B) applies when a lawyer or firm member may be called as a witness other than on
behalf of his client. In such circumstances, the firm need not resign "until it is apparent that his
testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client." DR 5-102(B); see, e.g., Kroungold v. Triester,
521 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1975); Freeman v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 449 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Ross v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 447 F. Supp. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The genesis of this
distinction is clear. Neither the current rule nor its predecessor, which applied only to the trial
lawyer who is a witness, was intended to allow counsel to disqualify opposing counsel by calling
him as a witness. See Galarowicz v. Ward, 119 Utah 611, 620, 230 P.2d 576, 580 (1951), citedin
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, canon 5 n.31. But in spite of its surface appeal,
the distinction makes little sense. If an attorney ought to testify, the rationale for disqualifying his
firm is equally applicable whether the testimony is on behalf of or contrary to the interests of his
client. The real question when trial counsel calls his opponent is whether calling opposing counsel
is warranted or is a tactical maneuver aimed at disqualification. Although this must be kept in
mind in interpreting the disciplinary rules and the judicial constructions thereof, it is largely pe-
ripheral to the interests of this article. From this point forward we will ignore this distinction and
concentrate on those cases in which the more common question, whether the attorney ought to
testify on behalf of his client, is raised. Unless otherwise distinguished, the withdrawal require-
ment in disciplinary rules 5-101(B) and 5-102 will hereinafter be referred to as the "withdrawal
rule."
20. 20 Cal. 3d at 918, 576 P.2d at 977, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 15 (Manuel, J., dissenting). Ironi-
cally, at least one court has said that the enforcement of the withdrawal rule by the court is not for
the purpose "of obtaining an adjudication as to what constitutes professional misconduct on the
part of an attorney, nor.., for the purpose of laying down guide rules for the future conduct of
an attorney on the speculation of what may develop during the litigation." Tru-Bite Labs, Inc. v.
Ashina, 54 App. Div. 2d 345, 388 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1976).
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the right to waive the enforcement of the rule.2' Rather, while the cli-
ent's opinion has been suggested as a factor to be considered,22 the
prevalent position is that although these disciplinary rules are for the
protection of clients, they are also for the protection of the bar and the
integrity of the court, and therefore may not be waived by the client.23
The crucial question in determining whether the withdrawal rule
applies in any situation is, when "ought" a lawyer testify at trial24 on
behalf of his client? Until it is determined that a lawyer ought to tes-
tify, his firm need not be disqualified.25 The question, then, is not
whether the attorney will be called, but whether he ought to be called,
either in the case in chief or in rebuttal.26 This, strangely, implies that
in some instances a firm would be disqualified when a member ought
to testify, even if it were clear that the member would not testify, and
conversely, that a firm would not be disqualified when a lawyer would
in fact testify even though he ought not.27 There is a reason behind this
21. In Town of Mebane v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 28 N.C. App. 27, 220 S.E.2d 623 (1975),
however, the court applied DR 5-101(B) and DR 5-102 by refusing to allow the testimony of the
attorney rather than requiring disqualification of the attorney. This is, in effect, a waiver with a
hook-that the client loses testimony he ought to have. See also Jones v. South Dakota Children's
'Home Soc'y, - S.D. -, 238 N.W.2d 677 (1976).
22. J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J., concur-
ring); Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348,
1354 (D. Colo. 1976). See also ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASS'N, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINION No.
389 (1972); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 339 (1975).
23. Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064,
1068 (N.D. Tex. 1977); OREGON STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 386
(1975). For this reason, they can be raised by the court on its own motion, 441 F. Supp. at 1067,
and cannot be waived by opposing counsel, COUNCIL OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR,
ETHICS OPINIONS, CPR 62 (1975).
24. No case has interpreted the meaning of trial, or what it means to testify at trial. It is
unclear whether testimony at trial includes a hearing on a preliminary injunction, as in Comden,
or other instances when written and oral testimony is taken. The closest any case has come is
deciding that a pretrial hearing in a criminal case is not a trial for purposes of the withdrawal rule.
People v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. App. 3d 491, 502, 148 Cal. Rptr. 704,711 (1978). Btulsee United
States v. Treadway, 445 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (grand jury constitutes "trial").
The Illinois State Bar Association has opined that an affidavit offered in lieu of testimony
would be testimony under the withdrawal rule. ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASS'N, PROFESSIONAL ETH-
ICS OPINION No. 540 (1977).
25. The question under DR 5-102(B) is whether the lawyer "may be called as a witness"
rather than whether he "ought to testify," but this is coupled with the question whether the law-
yer's testimony will be prejudicial to his client.
26. See J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359 (2d Cir. 1975); Norman Norrell,
Inc. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
27. See United States ex rel Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423
F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym Recrea-
tional & Athletic Equip. Corp., 546 F.2d 530, 538 n.21 (3d Cir. 1976) (arguing, perhaps only for
sake of argument, that DR 5-101 and DR 5-102 do not apply to expert witnesses, since they cannot
be characterized as witnesses who ought to testify).
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strange approach, for the court is in the unlikely position of determin-
ing, as a lawyer, when a particular person ought to be a witness.. Leav-
ing this question in the hands of the trial counsel, who would normally
determine who ought to be a witness, would allow the client, or the
lawyer, to avoid the ethical question entirely by not calling counsel's
colleague.28
Since the court is not always in a position to determine accurately
who actually ought to be called as a witness, courts have applied differ-
ent standards and approaches to the problem. One approach is to de-
scribe generally the factors involved in loose, but loaded, prose. For
example, the court in Comden discussed the issue as follows: 29
We deem the rule to require that the court first consider whether the
attorney's testimony will be necessary to protect his client's interest
and, if it concluded such testimony will likely be necessary, that it
order a timely withdrawal consistent with minimizing prejudices
which may result from the substitution of counsel. Whether an attor-
ney ought to testify ordinarily is a discretionary determination based
on the court's considered evaluation of all pertinent factors includ-
ing, inter alia, the significance of the matters to which he might tes-
tify, the weight his testimony might have in resolving such matters,
and the availability of other witnesses or documentary evidence by
which these matters may be independently established.3 °
This passage slithers from the question whether the attorney's "tes-
timony will be necessary" to whether the testimony "will likely be nec-
essary" to whether the attorney "ought to testify" under the
circumstances. The court views the last question in terms only of the
import of the testimony on establishing a matter, and of the import of
this to the client's position in the trial. Thus, the context of the trial
court's determination is purely the matter before it-presumably, at
least, it would be inappropriate for the trial court to determine that a
lawyer ought not testify in the matter before it, although the lawyer's
testimony might be helpful and relevant, because that testimony would
be damaging to the client in other ways.
As the broad stroke of the prose foreshadows, the court in Comden
left the path clear for a trial court to disqualify trial counsel's firm by
28. The lawyer would still have the obligation, of course, to act competently.
29. It first gave the dictionary definition of "ought" in a footnote, as "'used to express moral
obligation, duty, or necessity. . . or what is correct, advisable, or expedient.'" 20 Cal. 3d at 913
n.2, 576 P.2d at 974 n.2, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 12 n.2 (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1599 (1961)). This lent no light to the question.
30. Id at 913, 576 P.2d at 974, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
1979]
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vesting the trial court with "broad discretion to order withdrawal." 3I
More specifically, the court held that it would not grant petitioner's writ
of mandamus unless the facts commanded that the trial court's discre-
tion could be exercised in but one way.32
The court did not discuss when the facts would require that a trial
court's discretion be exercised only one way, but the weakness of the
motion to disqualify that was upheld in Comden is instructive. All of
the facts witnessed by attorney Marvin Greene of Loeb & Loeb were
witnessed by others. The most important piece of evidence to which
Greene could testify was the hearsay statement by Anthony Stram-
miello that he owned a fifty percent equity interest in the stock of Doris
Day Distributing Corporation, for which he paid $150,000. Others
present at the meeting also reported hearing this statement, although
Strammiello denied making it.33 Even if the crucial question were (and
it was not) whether Mr. Strammiello made the statement rather than
whether he owned the stock, it was certainly questionable (before depo-
sitions of others present at the meetings had been taken) whether Mr.
Greene's testimony would be needed or even helpful. Loeb & Loeb
posited that Mr. Greene's testimony would be unnecessary and offered
to withdraw if discovery failed to rule out the usefulness of Greene's
testimony.34 Faced with the questionable need for Greene's testimony,
the trial judge concluded not that Greene ought to testify, but merely
that he could not "'say with any degree of security or in good con-
science that Mr. Greene will not be called as a witness.' ',35 That, prob-
ably, was (and is) true of anyone, and certainly of every lawyer
involved in the case. The California Supreme Court's finding of no
abuse of discretion by the trial court leaves little if any reason for re-
straint by trial judges.
Other courts have given slightly more guidance on the questions of
when a lawyer "ought to testify" and when during the proceeding that
question should be determined. At one extreme is the position, recall-
ing the ethical considerations, that every doubt should be resolved in
favor of the attorney's testifying, and consequently in favor of
disqualification. Under this approach, "[t]he client is entitled to every
31. Id at 916, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
32. Id at 913, 576 P.2d at 974, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
33. Id
34. Id at 913, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
35. Id (quoting trial court).
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scrap of favorable evidence that is available, not only favorable evi-
dence that is essential to his case."'36 The potential testimony of any
attorney-witness with material evidence, whether or not it is duplicative
of other testimony, and no matter how far before trial, subjects the at-
torney and his firm to the withdrawal rule. Thus, one court required
each attorney with a case on its docket to notify the court as soon "as it
appeared that he or any member of his firm has any testimony that
could conceivably be used at trial."37
A more moderate position is that the testimony of the lawyer or
member of his firm that may be prejudicial to a client need not be
absolutely crucial for a disqualification motion to be granted, but
neither can it be so insignificant that it raises suspicion that the motion
is a tactical artifice or that there is no violation of the policy of the
underlying canon.38 This approach leads a court to examine whether
the testimony of plaintiff's attorney is genuinely needed, rather than
just helpful.39 Similarly, it may lead a trial court to delay decision in
appropriate circumstances to determine whether the attorney or some
other witness should testify.'
Yet since the determination whether an attorney's testimony is
necessary must be considered on a case-by-case basis, this standard of-
fers little more guidance than did the court in Comden.41 This is parti-
cularly true since delaying a decision on disqualification may increase
the impact of disqualification if later required.42 Since each trial court
may apply its own standards (and is left free to do so by the appellate
decisions), even if a trial counsel has in good faith determined that no
member of his firm will or ought to testify, application of the rule is
always possible. As a result, motions to disqualify will remain a vital
tactical weapon.4 3
36. Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064,
1068 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (emphasis in original).
37. Id at 1069 (emphasis in original).
38. See Freeman v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 449 F. Supp. 974, 978 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(applying DR 5-102(B) (which may explain why the position is more moderate)).
39. J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359 (2d Cir. 1975); Connell v. Clairol,
Inc., 440 F. Supp. 17, 18 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
40. Miller Elec. Constr., Inc. v. Devine Lighting Co., 421 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (W.D. Pa.
1976).
41. Norman Norrell, Inc. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
provides an excellent example of one analysis of the import of an attorney's potential testimony.
42. Compare Miller Elec. Constr., Inc. v. Devine Lighting Co., 421 F. Supp. 1020, 1023
(W.D. Pa. 1976), with Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 913-14, 576 P.2d at 974, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 12. But see Norman Norrell, Inc. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 127
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (delaying disqualification until trial).
43. See Freeman v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 449 F. Supp. 974, 977-78 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
1979]
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Another important question 44 faced by courts concerns the appli-
cability of the first exception.to DR 5-101(B), which states that the
withdrawal rule shall not apply "[ijf the testimony will relate solely to
an uncontested matter."45 One court has directly considered the appli-
cability of this exception and defined it so narrowly that it is negated
altogether.46 In that case a lawyer was to testify that his client was
ready to close a transaction in a timely fashion. Among other things,
the lawyer was to be called to testify to the papers in his briefcase at the
appointed time of the closing. As no one else had seen the contents of
the briefcase, the lawyer was the only possible witness to this informa-
tion. Nonetheless, the court held that such testimony went far beyond
the "uncontested matters" exception because "his testimony on what
was in his briefcase. . . was subject to an attack for credibility."47 Ob-
viously, if an attack for credibility suffices to remove the testimony
from the purview of the exception, the exception is meaningless.
From the client's perspective, perhaps the most striking question
that the courts have dealt with is the applicability of the substantial
hardship exception, which provides that the withdrawal rule is inappli-
cable "[a]s to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship
on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as
counsel in the particular case."'4 8 Since the client cannot by choice or
waiver avoid the imposition of the rule,4 9 the substantial hardship ex-
ception is the only aspect of the rule that runs directly in the client's
favor.
It should not come as a surprise by this time that the substantial
hardship limitation is strictly construed. In the words of one court:
This exception generally contemplates only an attorney who has
some expertise in a specialized area of the law such as patents and
Connell v. Clairol, Inc., 440 F. Supp 17, 19 (N.D. Ga. 1977); 20 Cal. 3d at 913, 576 P.2d at 973-74,
145 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12; text accompanying notes 96-98 infra.
44. One court has also discussed the issue whether a lawyer is a member of a firm when he is
"of counsel," holding it a factual question. J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359
(2d Cir. 1975). And the Los Angeles County Bar Association has opined that a lawyer temporar-
ily on leave from a law firm is a member of the firm for purposes of the withdrawal rule. Los
ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N ETHICS COMM., OPINION No. 367 (1977).
45. DR 5-101(B)(1). A related exception provides that the rule is inapplicable "[i]f the testi-
mony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no reason to believe that substantial
evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony." DR 5-101(B)(2). See also DR 5-102.
46. Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064,
1068 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
47. Id
48. DR 5-101(B)(4).
49. Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064,
1068 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
[Vol. 57
DISQUALIFIC4TION
the burden on the firm seeking to continue representation to prove
distinctiveness. In addition, the distinctive value must be apparent
before the decision to accept or refuse employment is made. Accord-
ingly, the Rule is to be very narrowly construed.50
One wonders why, if a lawyer has a particular expertise in a spe-
cialized area of the law, this distinctive value must be apparent (and to
whom) before the decision to accept or refuse employment is made.
Apparently, this additional requirement is added to prevent a firm
from acquiring information, either legal or factual, during the course of
representing a client and as a result becoming so important to the client
that the disqualification of the firm would constitute sufficient hard-
ship. In this way, a firm cannot avoid its ethical obligation to resign by
citing the expertise it has acquired in representing the client. As a con-
sequence, the client is not protected against losing the investment he
has made in his counsel, except in the rare circumstance in which the
firm was uniquely qualified to represent the client before it was hired.
While few cases have discussed the hardship exception in depth,
the limited applicability of the exception has been established. Al-
though in one recent case, in denying a motion to disqualify based
upon the withdrawal rule, the court focused on the cost of replacing in-
house corporate counsel in a relatively small action,51 the general rule
is that neither economic hardship suffered by the client,52 who must
hire a new law firm that must become acquainted with the case, nor
emotional or linguistic hardship is sufficient to invoke the exception.
Thus, in one case in which a firm had a ten year history of representing
plaintiff and had spent 450 hours in connection with plaintiff's case, the
court disqualified plaintiff's counsel on the day of the trial.53 In an-
other case an attorney who could speak Rumanian, the only language
the client could understand, who had represented plaintiff's family
members for many years, and who had great familiarity with represent-
ing Rumanians in general, was disqualified.54
50. Id at 1068-69 (citation omitted).
51. Stanwick Corp. v. United States, No. 77-115 (U.S. Ct. Cl., filed July 14, 1978).
52. Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR AsS'N ETHICS COMM., supra note 44. It might if this cost
threatened to bankrupt the client. Compare FLORIDA BAR ASS'N, ETHICS OPINION 76-26 (1977),
with ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 339 (1975).
53. United States ex rel. Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F.
Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Stagen Realty & Management, Inc. v. Superior Court, -
Cal. App. 3d , 151 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1979); Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR AsS'N ETHICS COMM.,
supra note 44.
54. Draganescu v. First Nat'l Bank, 502 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1974). The witness in that case
was trial cocounsel, but the court did not attach any significance to that fact. In addition, the
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Although courts have been stem in their application of the with-
drawal rule, they have been lax in precisely specifying its effects. The
typical court order does no more than require counsel to withdraw-it
neither provides a deadline for such withdrawal 5 nor specifies the serv-
ices that can be performed by the withdrawn counsel.56 No court has
seriously considered the question of an attorney's subsequent involve-
ment either in the case, as a researcher, investigator, negotiator or tacti-
cian, or in the client's other affairs, whether or not directly related to
the case. Similarly, no court has considered the effect of trial counsel's
or the witness' resignation or absence from the firm as a means of cur-
ing the dilemma.57 The result is that whatever benefit there is in strict
enforcement of the rule may be undermined by the continued involve-
ment of a disqualified firm in the affairs of the client.58
II. JUSTIFICATIONS
Few courts have closely examined the rationales for the rule. The
lengthy history of the rule disqualifying the trial counsel-witness has
lent support and color to the very different situation in which the entire
firm is disqualified.59
attorney, who had accepted the case on a contingency basis, alleged that other lawyers were reluc-
tant to accept such cases on a contingency basis. Nonetheless, his disqualification was held not to
be substantial hardship. Accord, Tru-Bite Labs, Inc. v. Ashman, 54 App. Div. 2d 345, 388
N.Y.S.2d 279 (1976). But see MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASS'N COMM. ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUs-
TICE, SUnCOMM. ON ETHICS, OPINION No. 75-2 (1975) (suggesting that mental condition of client
and his emotional dependence on attorney might constitute substantial hardship).
55. See, e.g., Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 916-18, 576 P.2d at 976-77, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 14-15. But see Norman Norrell, Inc. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 127,
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (ordering firm's disqualification from representation of client at trial only,
and specifically allowing disqualified firm to continue pretrial activities, including court appear-
ances, on behalf of client). See also MASSACHUSErTS BAR AsS'N COMM. ON ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, SUBCOMM. ON ETHICS, OPINION No. 75-4 (1975) (suggesting that DR 5-102(A) requires
withdrawals only from conduct of trial, not litigation).
56. See Draganescu v. First Nat'l Bank, 502 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 1974) (suggesting that
withdrawn counsel can continue to serve as interpreter).
57. The question of a former member of a firm was delicately avoided in International Elecs.
Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975). In J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357
(2d Cir. 1975), the court held that the question whether an attorney who was "of counsel" was "in
the firm" was a substantial issue of fact. See also Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N ETHICS
COMM., supra note 44 (holding that temporary leave of absence does not suffice to take attorney
out of firm).
58. See text accompanying notes 68-72 infra.
59. For a discussion of the rationales of the rule as they apply or have historically been
applied to the trial counsel-witness, see Enker, The Rationale ofthe Rule That Forbids a Lawyer to
Be Advocate and Witness in the Same Case, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 455; Sutton,
The Testifying Advocate, 41 TEx. L. REv. 477 (1963); Whitman, Comment on Recent Decisions of
Courts ofLast Resort on Ethical Propriety ofa Lawyer Appearing as a Witness in Case in Which He
Is Acting as Counsel, 9 A.B.A.J. 123 (1923); Comment, The Attorney as Both Advocate and
Witness, 4 CREIGHTON L. REv. 128 (1970); Note, The Ethical Propriety ofan Attorney's Testfying
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The ABA Code gives four interrelated reasons for the withdrawal
rule:
(I) If a lawyer is both counsel and witness, he becomes more easily
impeachable for interest and thus may be a less effective witness. (2)
Conversely, the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challeng-
ing the credibility of the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an
advocate in the case. (3) An advocate who becomes a witness is in
the unseemly and ineffective position of arguing his own credibility.
(4) The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the
function of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another,
while that of a witness is to state facts objectively.60
In addition to the four rationales set forth above, courts have inter-
preted the rule in conjunction with canon 9 of the ABA Code, which
provides that "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even The Appearance Of Pro-
fessional Impropriety."6
The cornerstone of the rationales presented in the Code is the as-
sertion that the roles of advocate and witness are inconsistent. In the
words of the Code, "the function of an advocate is to advance or argue
the cause of another."6 2 Yet this is an inaccurate description of attor-
neys, except, perhaps, litigators at trial. While the words "advocate"
and "witness" are rarely used to describe activities outside the litigation
context, an attorney representing a client in a negotiation, for example,
or in planning a transaction may serve as both representative and pro-
spective witness. This is because the planning attorney should create
facts beneficial to his client and state (or more precisely, augment) his
client's cause by, for example, discovering a beneficial fact or creating a
beneficial contractual provision. At the same time, the attorney should
arrange for the preservation of beneficial facts, as by placing himself in
an advantageous position to see or hear something.63
in Behalf of His Own Client, 38 IowA L. REv. 139 (1952); Note, The Advocate- Witness Rule." I'Z,
Then X, But Wy?, 52 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1365 (1977); Comment, The Rule Prohibiting an Attorney
from Testifying at a Client's Trial- An Ethical Paradox, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 268 (1976).
60. EC 5-9 (numerals added). Three of these reasons assume that the attorney will be a
witness on behalf of his client, rather than in opposition to his client.
61. See International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States ex re. Sheldon -lec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F.
Supp. 1348, 1354 (1. Colo. 1976); 20 Cal. 3d at 912, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
62. EC 5-9; see United States ex rel. Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing
Co., 423 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
63. Thus, while representing the Comdens, Greene placed himself in a position to hear alleg-
edly damaging statements made by his client's potential adversaries. 20 Cal. 3d at 912, 576 P.2d at
973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
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The function of preserving beneficial facts can often be accom-
plished most simply by a writing, a letter or a contract; and it is often
part of an attorney's responsibility to create that writing, and to do so
in the most advantageous way for his client. As a result, the attorney
may be a witness to the content of that writing, to its intent, to its deliv-
ery, or to any reaction to it. Of course, an attorney may also perform
this evidence-creating function by attending meetings, or by
investigation.
Thus an attorney's role as potential witness is often part of his role
as his client's representative. It may be as important as the deal he
makes or the contract he drafts, since without his testimony (or the
threat of his testimony) the client's position may be weakened or de-
feated. To expect that the intertwined role of representative and wit-
ness will or even can untangle when the matter reaches litigation, so
that the attorney can serve as a witness as defined in the Code-to pres-
ent the facts objectively without any professional interest-is oversim-
plistic. The attorney fashioned the facts so that as a witness he could
objectively put forward his client's (or even ex-cient's) position; that is,
he structured the situation so that he would be an objective advocate!'
His client's case and his reputation may still depend on how well he
performed that transactional function.
Once this distinction between advocate and witness is impeached,
the rationales for the withdrawal rule lose much of their support. The
first rationale for the rule presented in the ethical considerations is that
"[i]f a lawyer is both counsel and witness, he becomes more easily im-
peachable for interest and thus may be a less effective witness." 6 This
potential danger is certainly diminished when the attorney-witness
himself is not trial counsel but only a member of trial counsel's firm.65
Of course, "the opportunity still exists for opposing counsel to argue
that the attorney-witness' stake in the litigation as a member of his law
firm influences his objectivity";6 6 the disqualified firm's attorney is still
eligible to be a witness,67 and his impeachability for interest is not
64. EC 5-9. This rationale was cited prominently in both Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d at 912, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 11, and United States ex rel Sheldon Elec. Co. v.
Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
65. Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 912, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
66. Id
67. If the question is simply the effectiveness of the attorney as a witness, the client should be
the one to make the choice, unless some injury to the judicial process is involved. See id at 918,
576 P.2d at 977, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 15 (Manuel, J., dissenting).
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likely to evaporate with his firm's withdrawal from the case. For exam-
ple, in Comden, Loeb & Loeb was disqualified because Marvin Greene
ought to be called as a witness. If the case goes to trial and Greene is a
witness, he may be impeachable for the following reasons, 68 all related
to his law firm's representation of Comden: (1) the statements that he
witnessed occurred during his representation of Comden; (2) as an ex-
ercise of his professional judgment, which he (and his firm) would like
to see proved correct, he advised Comden to take her present course of
action, that is, to file suit; (3) he and his firm still represent Comden in
several other related matters; (4) as part of their representation of Coin-
den, he and his firm are still offering suggestions on the handling of this
case; and (5) his firm anticipates further payment from the Comdens.
Other possible grounds for impeachment, relating to the firm's prior
representation, are suggested by the facts of other cases. Perhaps the
most devastating to the witness would be that his firm still has a contin-
gent fee riding on the outcome of the case,69 or expects' a bonus or
further business if the transaction that is the subject of the litigation
ultimately proves successful.7" Or it may be simply that the party pre-
viously represented still owes the firm money. In other instances, the
attorney-witness might be a legal, business or investment partner of the
litigant, or might represent other parties, coplaintiffs or codefendants,
in the same case.7
The fact is that witnesses who at one time represented a litigant are
likely to be impeachable for interest for any number of reasons, and
forcing their firm to resign from the particular case is not likely to res-
urrect their credibility. Nor is the rule drafted to achieve this purpose,
since it eliminates only one area of impeachment of the testifying attor-
ney-his firm's present representation of the litigant at the trial-and
allows the continued involvement of the firm both in the client's affairs
that are the subject of the lawsuit and in the client's other business.72
68. Whether, as a matter of the law of evidence, factors of this sort are admissible, we do not
here fully explore.
69. See Draganescu v. First Nat'l Bank, 502 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 1974); Fracasse v. Brent,
6 Cal. 3d 784, 786, 494 P.2d 9, 10, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385, 386 (1977); Heinzman v. Fine, Fine, Legum
& Fine, 217 Va. 958, 960, 234 S.E.2d 282, 283 (1977).
70. See Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp.
1064, 1067 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
71. See Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 764 (3d Cir. 1975); Harrison v. Keystone Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 428 F. Supp. 149, 151-52 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
72. The rule is not applicable, for example, if the firm is other than trial counsel, although the
witness would be equally impeachable. See Nakasian v. Incontrade, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 229, 232 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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The second rationale for the rule set forth in the ethical considera-
tions is that the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging
the credibility of the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advo-
cate in the case.73 This argument, too, loses most, if not all, of its force
when the witness is not trial counsel but only a member of trial coun-
sel's firm. As the dissent in Comden pointed out:
[I]f the reason underlying disqualification is primarily opposing
counsel's difficulty in cross-examining a colleague, surely this handi-
cap will exist whether Loeb and Loeb remains as the representing
law firm or is suspended .... Defendants have shown no more det-
riment will occur if petitioners are at that point represented by Loeb
and Loeb, than if some other attorney is substituted in. Whatever
hesitancy their counsel may have in the cross-examination of a pro-
fessional colleague will be present in equal force no matter who rep-
resents the plaintiff Comdens.74
The third rationale presented in support of the withdrawal rule is
the unseemly and ineffective position of an advocate who must argue
his own credibility.75 Yet again, it is not the advocate-trial counsel ar-
guing his own credibility, but a member of the trial counsel's firm. If,
as the rule states, the witness cannot effectively argue his credibility, the
disqualification of his firm would seem a proper matter of trial tactics
rather than ethics. In making the tactical decision the factors to be
weighed should include the import to the client of the law firm, the
necessity of the lawyer's testimony, and the detriment to that testimony
caused by the lawyer's position within trial counsel's firm.
This issue of unseemliness is closely related, or identical, to the last
rationale for the withdrawal rule:
[T]he possibility [exists] that testimony by an attorney in the case
may lead the public to think "that lawyers may as witnesses distort
the truth," thereby diminishing the public's respect for and confi-
dence in the profession. Where doubt may becloud the public's view
of the ethics of the legal profession and thus impugn the integrity of
the judicial process, it is the responsibility of the court to ensure that
the standards of ethics remain high.76
73. See International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1294 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States ex rel. Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486, 489 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
74. 20 Cal. 3d at 918-19, 576 P.2d at 977, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 15 (Manuel, J., dissenting). See
also Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348, 1353
(D. Colo. 1976) (pointing out that ethical duty to represent client competently and zealously easily
outweighs professional hesitancy in cross-examining colleague).
75. See United States ex rel Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423
F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
76. Id at 489; see Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 912, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal.
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The argument that the public's respect for and confidence in lawyers
may be diminished by its view of the testifying advocate is grounded
principally in two commonly presented fictions, both of which are reit-
erated in the Code: witnesses are supposed to be neutral observers of
fact; and lawyers should avoid being witnesses because the role of a
lawyer and that of a witness are antithetical.17 The first of these is long
discredited. American courts permit and even encourage partisans to
be witnesses and allow the impeachment of witnesses, with the expecta-
tion that the judge or jury will evaluate the testimony in the light of the
witnesses' interest.78 The second fiction is, as already explained,
equally fallacious-the attorney's role may in part be to make himself a
witness.
What is unseemly, then, is the Code's sanctification of these
fictions as part of the lawyer's ethics. What is likely to reduce public
confidence in lawyers and legal ethics is the rule's existence, because it
emphasizes the impeachability and even the untrustworthiness of law-
yers' testimony, and because it calls for enforcement, which is no more
than a public display that lawyers do not abide by their own ethical
code.79 Thus the rule is self-perpetuating: it is unseemly for an attor-
ney whose firm is trial counsel in the case to testify because there is a
rule of ethics to the contrary.
III. THE CLIENT
The withdrawal rule makes no distinction between various clients.
At least as it is written and has been interpreted, the rule applies
equally to all clients. No client, no matter how sophisticated, can waive
Rptr. at 11. In this regard, however, the court in both International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527
F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975), and Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins.
Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Colo. 1976), warned against taking the view of the most cynical as the
voice of the public. 527 F.2d at 1294; 421 F. Supp. at 1353. Although the court in United States ex
rel Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
found this to be the most persuasive rationale for the disqualification, at least in a nonjury case, it
did not suggest what member of the public would lower his estimation of lawyers. 423 F. Supp. at
489-90. It seems that the client, as the member of the public with the most at stake, is likely to be
offended that he cannot waive the withdrawal rule, but rather must make his own sacrifices for the
public relations of the legal profession.
77. EC 5-9.
78. See Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp.
1348, 1354 (D. Colo. 1976).
79. This is not to suggest that violations of the ethical code should go unpunished. When
rules of ethics are unnecessary to protect the client or the profession, however, there is no purpose
in enforcing them except for discipline's sake.
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application of the rule."° Because the rule focuses on the lawyer, it
misses what may be important distinctions between clients. Clients are
different in a number of ways that may require different analyses of the
rule. Some clients seek the services of a lawyer only for a particular
matter in a crisis situation. This is the customary situation with middle
to low income persons who see a lawyer only when faced with an im-
mediate legal problem, usually in the litigation context, often because
they have been involved in a tort or have been arrested. Usually no
great harm to the client results if the lawyer first selected declines the
representation."1 As long as there are a sufficient numbers of lawyers
in the community, another may be found. Yet even in these situations,
when the attorney has no pre-existing relationship with the client, and
the client seeks legal help only with a particular litigation matter, a
shift of lawyers is likely to be disquieting to the client. The lawyer who
has investigated with the client the factual circumstances of the case,
who has begun to communicate effectively with the client, and who has
gained the client's confidence must be replaced by a stranger.8 2 An-
other problem that may be caused by disqualification is the disruption
of the fee arrangement. In contingent fee situations, some split of the
contingency, or other formula, may be used to determine the compen-
sation of successive lawyers.8 3 The first lawyer is certainly entitled to
some recovery, whether measured by quantum meruit or another the-
ory, if he did substantial work before it became apparent that he ought
to be a witness.8 4 As a result it may be difficult, or at least costly, to
find subsequent counsel.
80. The one exception to this is an attorney-litigant who represents himselfpro se, or who has
his own firm represent him. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
81. The client's statements to the attorney, even though the engagement does not materialize,
are protected by confidentiality, so the client is not prejudiced.
82. To some people unaccustomed to dealing with lawyers, hiring a lawyer is traumatic; and
being forced to repeat the process may mean more than recurring trauma, it may cause the client
to forsake his claim.
83. In some instances, a dispute may arise concerning the issue whether the disqualification
was foreseeable and thus whether the lawyer was at fault. A lawyer at fault would not be entitled
to share.
84. Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 791, 494 P.2d 9, 14, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385, 390 (1972).
85. E.g., Draganescu v. First Nat'l Bank, 502 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 1974) (client's language
barrier created difficulty in retaining subsequent counsel); ef Stanwick Corp. v. United States, No.
77-115 ( U.S. Ct. CI., filed July 14, 1978) (corporate counsel not disqualified; additional expense of
employing outside counsel not justified). This problem may be heightened because lawyers who
take cases on a contingency often do so partly because of the likelihood of settling at an early stage
in the proceedings. A lawyer, of course, cannot withdraw if the matter does not settle profitably.
DR 2-110. Ironically, only a forced resignation might make the situation profitable, or at least less
costly for the disqualified lawyer who took the case expecting to turn a profit on a settlement only
to find a settlement unobtainable.
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The client such as the typical entrepreneur who approaches a law-
yer seeking broad-based representation presents different problems.
This client is most interested in developing a lasting relationship with
the attorney. He sees the attorney's function as a general problem
solver, rather than as an advocate in a particular situation. He is likely
to keep the attorney on retainer, so that the attorney will be knowledge-
able about his affairs and available both for day-to-day matters and
whenever an emergency arises. Since he is likely to view his relation-
ship with his attorney as a business investment, the firm's disqualifica-
tion, even for a particular case, may not only be costly in the particular
case, but may destroy or damage an important business asset. When
the firm is disqualified, or resigns, the client may start over again with a
new firm or, more likely, retain the disqualified firm as his firm for
other matters and even, to the extent allowed, as a consultant with re-
spect to the case on which the firm member will be a witness.86
Perhaps the most interesting dilemma is when the client and law-
yer are identical or, like Siamese twins, inseparable. One such problem
is the lawyer who represents himself. To some extent, the rationale of
preserving the integrity and unimpeachability of lawyers applies more
strongly to the lawyer representing himself, since he is more impeacha-
ble for interest, and therefore potentially more embarrassing to the pro-
fession, than the lawyer who is a witness to the affairs of a client. At
least one case has held, however, that a lawyer who is a party and
ought to testify may be represented by his own firm.8 7
A more important situation in which lawyer and client are identi-
cal occurs in the cases of corporate counsel and government law offices.
While the rule is applicable to such situations, the purposes of the rule
are not served by preventing corporate counsel or government law of-
fices from being involved in litigation. In spite of withdrawal, corpo-
rate counsel is likely to be intimately involved with the trial process,
and the witness is likely to remain impeachable for interest because he
is the agent of (and his personal livelihood is dependent upon) the cli-
ent. Thus, the result of the disqualification of corporate counsel is to
86. This was the case in Comden. 20 Cal. 3d at 916, 576 P.2d at 976, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 14
(Manuel, J., dissenting).
87. Harrison v. Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 428 F. Supp. 149 (M.D. Pa. 1977); VIR-
GINIA STATE BAR, LEGAL ETHICS INFORMAL OPINION No. 114; NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINION No. 353 (1974). In Harrison, the court disqualified
the firm involved from representing a codefendant; thus the court's decision resulted in both the
impeachment of an interested lawyer and the cost to one client of replacing that same lawyer. The
court did not investigate how much more impeachable the lawyer-witness would have been if his
firm had been allowed to continue its representation of its partner's codefendant.
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require the corporation to incur the expense of having outside counsel
without protecting the client or the judicial process. 88
In this era of the taxpayer's revolt, it is perhaps more shocking that
government firms, such as district attorneys, have been disqualified
under the rule if a lawyer in the office ought to be a witness in a trial.89
The expense involved in disqualifying government offices involved
with criminal matters, while certainly substantial, may be exceeded by
the cost of the disqualification of government civil law offices. Since
these offices often negotiate agreements as well as handle any ensuing
litigation, the rule will apply in a large percentage of such an office's
litigation. While such agencies may try to avoid the application of the
rule in the future by dividing into a nonlitigation and a litigation firm,
this nominal change in structure will either be disregarded by courts or
expose how flimsy are the rule's underlying rationales.
IV. THE LAWYER AND THE LAWYERING PROCESS BEFORE
LITIGATION IS CONTEMPLATED
The withdrawal rule by its terms does not apply until there is con-
templated or pending litigation. Nonetheless, the rule may have a
profound effect on the lawyer and the lawyering process before a dis-
pute arises. This, in part, is because much, if not most, predispute
lawyering anticipates some dispute resolution machinery, whether arbi-
tration" or trial. The lawyer structures the client's affairs so that, if
necessary, a court or other dispute resolver will vindicate his client. Be-
cause, in this sense, the lawyer always contemplates the possibility of
litigation, he must consider the effect of the rule if litigation develops.
88. Partly for this reason, the court in Stanwick Corp. v. United States, No. 77-115 (U.S. Ct.
Cl., filed July 14, 1978), did not require withdrawal, although the court implied that in appropriate
circumstances, such as when the additional expense would be more defensible, corporate counsel
might be disqualified from acting as trial counsel. See Norman Norrell, Inc. v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 127, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see Gasoline Expressway, Inc. v. Sun Oil
Co., - App. Div. 2d -, 407 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1978); FLORIDA BAR ASS'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, OPINION No. 76-26 (1977) (rule applied when attorney was stockholder, vice president
and attorney for corporation); Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N ETHICS COMM., supra note 44.
89. See People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 255, 561 P.2d 1164, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1977);
People v. Lopez, 79 Cal. App. 3d 963, 145 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1978) (withdrawn from publication by
order of court); Letter from Albert Bell, Counsel, Ohio State Bar Association, to John J. Adams,
Law Director, City of Kettering (March 20, 1978). That the attorney testified may not prevent
defendant from obtaining a fair trial. People v. Guerreno, 47 Cal. App. 3d 441, 120 Cal. Rptr. 732
(1975); State v. Johnson, 224 Kan. 466, 580 P.2d 1339 (1978); Harris v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 357, 254
N.W.2d 291 (1977).
90. The rule does not on its face apply to administrative proceedings or to arbitrations, ex-
cept perhaps to the extent that litigation following the proceedings is contemplated. If the major
purpose of the rule is to protect the image of lawyers by relieving them from one area of impeach-
ment, the rule would seem equally applicable to such proceedings.
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Without the rule, for example, the lawyer may worry about the effect of
writing a demand letter or making a demand. With the rule, the lawyer
also needs to evaluate the legal, tactical and extra-legal effect of writing
the letter or attending the meeting. The legal effect of the rule is the
resulting disqualification of the firm if the rule is applicable. The tacti-
cal effect of the rule, which we will investigate later, is simply the disad-
vantage of raising an issue of the applicability of the rule in any
subsequent litigation. The extra-legal effect of the rule is its impact on
the ability of the firm, and of lawyers in general, to render good, cost-
efficient legal services to the client. This evaluation of the extra-legal
impact of the rule must necessarily take into account the value of the
firm's general representation of the client, the detriment to the client of
the firm's disqualification from the particular litigation, and the impact
of and harm to the attorney-client relationship. While the impact of the
rule in particular situations is unclear, its impact on the predispute
lawyering process is unmistakable. One court identified the hardship
to the client who later becomes embroiled in litigation in the following
way:
One reason for maintaining a continuing relationship with a lawyer
or law firm is to prevent the difficulty which would ensue if each time
litigation was commenced a new attorney would be required to fa-
miliarize himself with the client and its business. The advantages of
preventive law, like preventive medicine, is [sic] well recognized
through this profession as a means of settling business problems
before they require expensive and time-consuming litigation. A cli-
ent who desires to head off a court battle should not be penalized for
having the foresight to employ legal counsel before the commence-
ment of a lawsuit. Requiring a litigant to change counsel when a suit
is filed surely causes some degree of hardship.91
As the rule comes to be more frequently applied by courts and followed
by practitioners of their own volition, the advantages of seeking legal
help for incipient transactions may be reduced. Indeed, clients with a
91. Greenebaum-lvlountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348,
1352 (D. Colo. 1976). See also Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 916, 576 P.2d at 976, 145
Cal. Rptr. at 14. Some may urge that when litigation results, the preventive law performance of
the lawyer was inadequate, so that substitution of counsel does not harm the preventive law con-
cept. Preventive law lawyering does endeavor to maximize legal opportunities and also to mini-
mize the risk of later legal trouble, but it does not necessarily fail if litigation results. In
transactional and other nonadversarial matters predictable trouble can often be eliminated, but at
the cost of giving up too much at early preventive law stages. For example, an ambiguous con-
tract may lead to foreseeable litigation. That litigation could have been avoided by an unambigu-
ously worded contract, but the cost of clarity may be greater than the cost of litigation. See
generally L. BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL
LEGAL PROCESS (1978) (especially chs. 6 and 7).
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particularly valuable relationship with their attorneys may be advised
to carefully limit the attorneys' roles in such transactions.
A more subtle but perhaps more harmful effect of the rule is its
impact on the lawyering ability of a preventive lawyer. The rule not
only interferes with the attorney-client relationship but impairs one of
the preventive lawyer's most useful techniques, making himself an ad-
ministrator-witness who enforces or maximizes his client's fights.
When possible, the preventive lawyer wants to perceive the contractual
breach, or to investigate the tort. He does so not only because he can
do it better than the client, but because it puts him in a better position
to negotiate a settlement, since he can gauge more precisely the
strength of his client's prospective case if litigated, and since he can
ensure that his client will have a good witness. And, contrary to popu-
lar belief, the lawyer often makes a very good witness, not because of
his courtroom manner, however good or bad, but because the lawyer
lmows what to witness.
Once the lawyer-client relationship is established, the harm inher-
ent in the withdrawal rule becomes more apparent (but not necessarily
more real) as the transaction moves closer and closer toward litigation.
As litigation looms nearer it becomes more likely that counsel will, in
fact, resign or be disqualified from the litigation if a member of his firm
is a witness. As a result, counsel must become increasingly circumspect
about how his firm is involved, and what it witnesses, in the course of
representation.
In the future a lawyer may refuse to engage in settlement negotia-
tions92 or factual investigations because of the possibility that, as a re-
sult of his participation, he might become a witness and thereby at a
minimum give his opponent a new tactical weapon in any ensuing liti-
gation. As a result, settlement negotiation might not take place, or the
lawyer might abdicate some of his traditional functions by having a
nonlawyer (often the client) conduct settlement discussions and factual
investigations to insulate the firm from the application of the rule.
Thus the rule, by interfering with the lawyer-client relationship, by lim-
iting the usefulness of legal planning in the early stages of a transac-
tion, by interfering with the techniques used by preventive lawyers, and
by encouraging nonlawyers to succeed to functions traditionally per-
formed by lawyers, would often result in poorer representation, and
92. As is evident from the Comden case, the possibility of disqualification is not cured just
because settlement negotiations may be privileged. 20 Cal. 3d at 912, 576 P.2d at 973, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 11.
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ironically might deter a settlement that would, among other things,
have avoided the application of the rule.93
V. THE LITIGATION CONTEXT
While the rule has an impact on lawyering even before there is a
dispute, and a firm may have to withdraw from or decline representa-
tion as soon as litigation is contemplated, the initiation of litigation re-
mains the crucial step in the application of the withdrawal rule. Not
until a suit has been filed does a court have the right to apply the rule
by requiring disqualification. Because from the moment of the filing of
the suit the court process anticipates the eventual trial, it seems logical
that the rule may require disqualification of a firm as soon as suit is
filed.94 But because the rule is aimed only at preventing an attorney
from testifying, which can occur only at trial, and since relatively few
cases, once filed, proceed to a trial on the merits, enforcing the rule as
soon as suit is filed results in unnecessary disqualification, and thus
inconvenience and expense, in a great number of cases.95
Because the rule is applicable and the court, as enforcer, is present,
the tactical value of the rule flowers when a dispute enters the litigation
context, a fact that has not been ignored by courts. As the court noted
in Comden: "It would be naive not to recognize that the motion to
disqualify opposing counsel is frequently a tactical device to delay liti-
gation. '96 But while the courts have not been blind to the tactical value
of the rule, neither have they fully considered it. Even in the most
usual circumstances, the tactical use of the rule may be more varied
than just to delay the litigation. There may be tremendous advantage
93. We do not mean to imply that the rule itself fosters litigation. By being a tactical weapon,
it may favor one side or the other, but this can be taken into account in reaching a settlement. But
to the extent that it results in nonlawyers drafting documents and deters lawyers, skilled negotia-
tors, from engaging in settlement discussions, it is likely to increase litigation.
94. Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064
(N.D. Tex. 1977), required attorneys "to notify court as soon as it appears that they or members of
their firms have any testimony that could conceivably be used at trial." Id at 1069 (emphasis in
original).
95. This unnecessary expense could be avoided, at least in part, by adopting the approach of
the court in Norman Norrell, Inc. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), which did not require withdrawal of the disqualified firm until trial. This result, while
certainly preferable to early disqualification, may seriously affect settlement, even if the case does
not go to trial, by giving the disqualified firm's adversary a decided edge because late disqualifica-
tion itself may be prejudicial or at least detrimental to the client. See Miller Elec. Constr., Inc. v.
Devine Lighting Co., 421 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
96. 20 Cal. 3d at 915, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13; see Connell v. Clairol, Inc., 440 F.
Supp. 17, 19 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
1979]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in disqualifying the opposing counsel. As indicated, in some circum-
stances new counsel may be unobtainable. In other cases, the expense
incurred in hiring new counsel may be significant, even if not a "sub-
stantial hardship." Even when the motion will eventually be lost, there
may be an economic incentive to make a disqualification motion be-
cause the cost to the opponent of waging the battle may be quite
large-in one case the designation of record for the motion alone con-
tained nearly 1,000 pages.97 In addition, while an opponent's attention
is focused on the motion, action on the merits may be delayed.9 Thus
a party might use the motion to control the tempo of a lawsuit. The
existence of the rule also may open the scope of discovery to permit, or
even require, discovery centered on whether the attorney ought to be a
witness. Further, because delaying decision on a disqualification mo-
tion may increase the prejudice to the client, this discovery might prop-
erly be expedited in some circumstances. Discovery, of course, would
be a perfect vehicle for harassing the opposing firm by taking deposi-
tions of all attorneys involved, in the hope of discovering at least one
potential witness. In other circumstances, attorneys may wish to avoid
disqualification of their counterparts. The reasons for this may range
from a particularly good working relationship to the hope that the at-
torney-witness will be more easily impeached, and thus his testimony
rendered less harmful.99
While the trial court has the authority to raise the applicability of
the rule on its own motion, 00 it will rarely be in a position to do so
unless the attorney testifies, submits an affidavit, or is listed as a poten-
tial witness at the pretrial, or unless the issue is otherwise brought to
the court's attention. Thus, while it may be an attorney's ethical duty
97. Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348,
1351 (D. Colo. 1976). In a modest effort to ascertain data about the costs involved, we requested
information from some lawyers involved in reported cases. The replies we received are that cost
of the motion was: "$10,000"; "$9,000"; "difficult to segregate"; "difficult to quantify-estimate
$3,500"; "twenty to thirty hours"; "with appeal $10,000"; "approximately $3,045, including the
appeal"; "not available"; "$3,500 plus the cost of the transcript of my testimony, which was prob-
ably five or six hundred dollars."
98. See Miller Elec. Constr., Inc. v. Devine Lighting Co., 421 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (W.D. Pa.
1976). For this reason, the firm that successfully fought a motion to disqualify in Greenebaum-
Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Colo. 1976), advised
its client to hire new counsel rather than delay trial on the merits to await the outcome of the
appeal of the disqualification motion. Note, The Advocate- Wltness Rule: If Z, Then X, But Why?,
supra note 59, at 1380 n.88.
99. See Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp.
1064, 1067 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
100. Id at 1067; Stagen Realty & Management, Inc. v. Superior Court, - Cal. App. 3d -,
151 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1979).
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to bring to the attention of the court possible violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, an attorney may intentionally overlook the
applicability of the rule or may attempt to agree with opposing counsel
not to raise the issue in exchange for some concession.101
The more the rule is used as a tactical device, the greater the cost
both to the client and to the judicial system. 'While the cost of the rule
to the client may seem paramount, the cost to the judicial system
should not be ignored. Because, like other procedural matters, the dis-
qualification motion is collateral to the core of the dispute between the
litigating parties, bringing the motion is unlikely to bring the litigation
to a halt, or to reduce the expense or complexity of the litigation proc-
ess, although responding to a disqualification may consume much judi-
cial time and energy. Even when the motion is successful and a firm is
forced to resign, the case continues. Indeed, the added cost and delay
incurred while the new attorneys become acquainted with the action
may significantly increase a court's burden. 0 2
VI. SUGGESTIONS
In sum, the withdrawal rule does not serve the client, the lawyer or
the judicial process. The rationales for the rule are flimsy even when
applied to the nondifferentiated client and attorney relationship. Ap-
plied to the myriad of different attorney-client relationships, the rule is
often counter-productive because it interferes with the lawyer-client re-
lationship, with lawyering and with the judicial process, and does so
unnecessarily in the vast majority of situations that do not result in a
trial. The rule is presented as a matter of ethics, rather than economics,
and therefore does not purport to be practical. Courts and legislatures
have accepted and implemented it without scrutinizing either the ratio-
nales that supposedly underlie it, or any empirical data showing that
the rule is importanrt to the standing or reputation of the profession. In
this sense, enforcing the rule to protect the "'public trust within the
scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar' "103
may be a pyrrhic triumph.
101. See, e.g., United States v. McKoy, 448 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
102. See Ross v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 447 F. Supp. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court noted
delay and congestion that would result if counsel were disqualified).
103. Comden v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 915, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13
(quoting Hull v. Cellanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975)); see Supreme Beef Processors,
Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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At least in California, the rule has been the subject of much dis-
cussion since the Comden decision. The California State Bar has re-
cently proposed amending the California version of the rule to, among
other things, eliminate the effects of the Comden decision by making
the rule inapplicable to law firms as distinguished from individual law-
yers in a firm. This approach avoids the difficulties of the rule's appli-
cation to various clients at various times, as well as the difficulties
inherent in applying ethical standards in the context of ongoing litiga-
tion to which any ethical violation is collateral. Consequently, this ap-
proach would avoid most tactical applications of the proposed rule and
the concomitant impact on practice.'04
If there is unethical conduct, in the true as well as the codified
sense, then the attorney rather than the client should directly bear the
consequences. A bar disciplinary hearing is a more equitable forum to
mete sanctions upon the attorney than is the court of the ongoing
litigation.
Although we believe that the revocation of the rule is appropriate,
we recommend that in practice a lawyer inform his client in as much
detail as possible about the detriment of continuing representation
when a member of the firm wll'0 5 or may testify, so that the client can
determine if the continued representation would be beneficial. Obvi-
ously the less sophisticated the client, the more detailed should be the
lawyer's explanation, and the more the lawyer should suggest that the
client consult independent counsel on this question alone. With certain
clients who are or contain their own legal staffs, such as corporate
counsel, asking the question may suffice to answer it.
The question of the testifying firm member should be considered
one of attorney competence and attorney-client relations. Thus, rather
than appearing under canon 5, which is aimed principally at conflicts
of interest, the requirement that a lawyer inform a client of the effects
of his continued representation if a firm member may be a witness
might appropriately appear as a corollary to canon 6 of the Code,
104. The previous proposal made the client's consent to a firm's continued representation a
subject before the court, and as a result entailed continued judicial involvement in the applicabil-
ity ofthe rule and in such issues as the substance and understanding of the client's waiver. Report
and Recommendations of the State Bar of California Board of Governors Committee on Lawyer's
Services, Appendix B, Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 2-
I111(A)(4) (December 28, 1978).
105. Here, since the attorney and client rather than the court are determining who will testify,
the question can be actual rather than speculative.
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which provides that "A Lawyer Should Represent A Client Compe-
tently." Explaining the detriment of one's firm's continued representa-
tion is one aspect of competent representation, just as declining
employment when one's particular legal skills are deficient is an aspect
of competent representation. °6 This shotild eliminate the use of the
rule as a tactical weapon; it should also reduce the enormous costs of
the rule, both direct and indirect, not only in the planning stages of a
transaction, but in all stages of the litigation.
We have in the past criticized the Code because of its unrespon-
siveness to preventive practices. 0 7 We see the rule as another illustra-
tion of a system of ethics that ignores the sine qua non of the legal
profession-the client'°-and speaks, out of habit, of legal practice as
courtroom practice. While the rule is indeed harmful to the profession
and, we believe, to public confidence in the profession, the Code's fail-
ure to portray accurately lawyers and the practice of law, and its perpe-
tration and public espousal of myths, such as the inconsistency of being
both advocate and witness, may ultimately prove even more harmful.
The Code should be reexamined and rewritten so that legal ethics as
codified serve the public and client, in the general rather than the spe-
cific sense, and reflect-indeed, if possible, enhance-the myriad ways
in which the modem lawyer serves the client and society.'0 9
106. DR 6-101(A)(1). Competent representation may include more than this one instance of
informed participation by a client. We believe that the Code has distorted the proper attorney-
client relationship in the planning context and minimized the role of the client. See Brown &
Brown, What Counsels the Counselor, The Code of Professional Resvonsibility's Ethical Considera-
tions-A Preventive Law Analysis, 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 453 (1976).
107. See Brown & Brown, supra note 106.
108. A voice in the wilderness, Stanwick Corp. v. United States, No. 77-115 (U.S. Ct. Cl., filed
July 14, 1978), states clearly that, in the opinion of that court, the rule is for the benefit of the
client. This contrasts with the prevalent view, at least in reported opinions, that the rule exists for
the protection of the bar and of the integrity of the court, as well as for the clients. See, e.g.,
Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (N.D.
Tex. 1977). In our opinion, that philosophical approach, more than any substantive distinction
(although there were some), explains why that court construed the rule more liberally than other
courts, and refused to disqualify counsel.
109. See Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal
Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 619, 646 (1978) ("lawyers as a profession are uniquely insulated
from the normal workings of the political process").

